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Misaligned Dollar
If recent trends continue, the dollar could
soon fly as high as Skylab, but it may not
come back down to earth as quickly. Since
1980, the dollar has risen, almost without
interruption, to its highest level in over a
decade. The dollar's average foreign cur-
rencyvalue is now 26 percenthigherthan in
1980, and nearly 5 percent higher than at
the beginning ofthis year (see Chart 1).
The dollar's rise is all the more remarkable in
that itseems to havedefied economic forces
conventional wisdom says should have
pulled itdown. Normally, higher inflation in
the U.S. than abroad would be expected to
result in a falling dollar. Yet the dollar has
risen dramatically over the last three years
againstthe currencies ofWest Germany,
Japan, and Switzerland - all ofwhom have
had, on average, lower inflation than our
dWn. As a result, the real, or inflation-
adjusted, valueofthe dollar is atan unprece-
dented level. This has made U.S. goods
more expensive in relation to foreign goods
than they have been in many years.
Conventional wisdom would also say that
a high and rising U.S. current account
deficit should push the dollardown. But the
dollar has continued its ascent duringthe
last eighteen months, despite aprecipitous
decline in our current account - which
reached a record deficitof nearly $40
billion in 1983.
The dollar's apparent defiance of
"economic gravity" has led many observers
to wonder whether there is something
seriously amiss in the foreign exchange
markets. They have speculated that afall in
the dollar is inevitable, perhaps even
imminent. Concerns that the dollar is
"misaligned" and underminingthe
competitiveness of U.S. products in
world markets have prompted calls for
massive intervention in the foreign
exchange markets, and other measures, to
bringthe dollarback down.
This Letter explains that, as unusual as the
dollar's behavior has been over the last
several years, there is nothing economicaUy
"irrational" aboutit. Nor, unfortunately, is a
high dollar necessarily unsustainable.
Real interest rates
The main key to the dollar's rise lies in
the equally unprecedented behaviorof U.S.
real interest rates in recentyears. The real
interest rate is simply the nominal interest
rate earned on an investment less the
inflation expected to occurover the
investment's life. That is, the real interest
rate measures the gain in purchasing power
from an investment.
Increases in U.s. real interest rates (relative
to those abroad) have made dollar
investments more attractive than invest-
ments in othercurrencies. Capital flows
attracted to our shores have pushed the
dollarup on the foreign exchanges. This
process, however, is self-limiting mainly
because real interest increases are the tem-
porary result ofexcess demands in credit
marketsand so have nopermanenteffect on
the dollar's value. Thus, as the dollar's
current value rises with the increase in our
real interest rates, the amount by which it is
expected to depreciate in the future goes up
by the same amount. The dollar stops rising
when its expected future depreciation just
compensates for the higher real interest
earned on dollar investments.
On this basis, an increase ofonepercentage
point in the one-year U.S. real interest rate
relative to rates abroad can be expected to
raise the dollar by one percent above its
long-run value, everything else being equal.
However, the same increase in the
(annualized) real interest rate on aten-year
U.S. security could raise thedollarby almost
ten times this, amount - ten percent-
because a one percent increase in the yield
on a ten-year investment represents ten._--------_.
times as much additional interest earned
as the same increase on a one-year
investment. Thus, modest increases in
longer-term real interest rates can have
considerably more-than-proportionate
impacts on the dollar's current value.
There can be little doubt that short-term and
long-term U.S. real interestrates are now
considerably higherthan they were in 1980.
Nominal Treasury bond rates, for example,
are now at about their average level during
that year despite a U.S. inflation rate that is
only one-halfthat ofthree years ago (Chart
2). Given this record, and Administration
and Federal Reserve commitments to
contain inflation in the future, it is not
unreasonable to suppose that inflation
anticipated over the next several years has
also fallen substantially. Indeed, the survey
taken byWalter Hoey, vice president and
chiefeconomistofWarburg Paribus/A.G.
Becker, indicates that inflation expected
over the next five years has dropped nearly'
three percentage points since 1980. Thus,
real medium and long-term U.s. interest
rates very likely have risen substantially
since that year. By contrast, foreign nations'
long-term nominal interest rates have
generally fallen or remained constant in
relation to their inflation over the last
several years. This suggests that U.S. real
interest r<:jtes have risen substantially in
comparison to those abroad as well. Such
increases could account for most ofthe
dollar's strength, given the substantial
"leverage" on exchange rates exerted by
longer-term interest rates.
High and rising U.S. real interest rates also
explain the dollar's continued rise even as
our current account has fallen deeply into
deficit. As our interest rates have pulled the
dollar up, the prices of u.s. goods traded on
world markets have risen dramatically in
relation to those ofour foreign competitors.
U.S. exporters therefore have encountered
increasing difficulty in selling abroad, and
U.S. producers at home have found itmore
difficultto compete with foreign imports.
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As a result, our imports have grown
considerably faster than ourexports,
causing ourcurrent account balance
to deteriorate dramatically.
High U.S. real interest rates, then, appearto
be the rT]ain cause ofthe high dollarand
our increasing external deficit. But this
answer to the dollar puzzle only raises
another question ~ why have U.S. real
interest rates risen so much?
Monetary policy
Part ofthe answer lies with the
change in U.S. monetary policy beginning
in 1979. At that time, the Federal
Reserve began a program of reducing
money growth to lower our inflation ~ then
in the double-digit range.
Normally, slower money growth takes
several years to bring inflationdown, mainly
because wages and prices are constrained
by contracts and other institutional
impediments from responding immediately.
Decelerating moneygrowth results atfirst in
adecline in real liquidity, as individualsand
businesses find their cash holdings growing
more slowly than their expenditures. This
decline in real liquidity pushes up real
interest rates. Real interest rates are apt to
continue to rise as long as real liquidity is
declining, that is, until the rate of inflation
falls below the rate of money growth.
At that point, real liquidity begins to rise
again, reducing pressures in credit markets
and allowing real interest rates to fall
back toward more normal levels.
The decline in U.S. inflation and money
growth since 1979 provides a vivid illustra-
tion ofthe first halfofthis process. During
the 1980-81 period, inflation measured by
the GNP deflator averaged 9.3 percent,
nearly 3 percentage points greater than the
growth ofMloverthe same interval. The
result was a substantial decline in real
money balances and hence in real liquidity.
Notsurprisingly, short-term real interest




In short, the dollar's initial rise in the several
years after 1979 can be attributed to IItight
ll
monetary policy. But because inflation has
now declined, the dollar's continued
strength since 1982 can be attributed to
IIloose" fiscal policy. Fiscal policy,
therefore, now bears the primary responsi-
bility for the continueddeterioration
ofour trade and current accounts.
Chart 2
30 Year Bonds and Inflation
what will happen to the dollar in the future.
U.S. government budget deficits have
soared overthe last several years, rising from
$17 billion in 1979 to an estimated $195
billion dollars in 1983. Given current
policies, the deficits could well remain near
$200 billion for many years to come. The
unprecedented level ofgovernment
borrowing these deficits have entailed
probably has added greatly to pressures
on our real interest rates, keeping them
high even as the pressures from tighter
monetary policy were abating.
When will thedollarcomedown? When our
real interest rates fall, but when will that
happen? Alas, unless steps are soon taken to
reduce future budget deficits substantially,
there can be little hope for any dramatic fall
in U.s. real interest rates, and hence for the
dollar, over the coming year. Even worse, if
huge budget deficits persist over the
remainder ofth is decade, as may be the case
without major policy changes, the dollar
- can beexpected to remain high by historical
standards - although probably not as
high as now - and the current account
to remain very deeply in deficit.
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The U.S. experience during this period was
not unique. Beginning in early 1979, the
Thatchergovernment in Great Britain also
began an anti-inflationary drive. Money.
growth (M1) slowed sharply and interest
rates rose even as inflation declined. This
increase in British real interest rates was a
major factor contributing to the nearly
twenty percent rise in the value ofthe pound
versus the dollar between 1979 and 1980,
although rising British oil exports duringthis








U.S. fiscal policywouId seem to providethe
answer to this last question - and the key to
120
norwas it surprising, given the protracted
nature ofthe decline inliquidity, that real
long-term interest rates also rose. These
interest rate increases - particularly the rise
in longer-term real interest rates - were
mainly responsible for the dollar's
remarkable ascent during this period, and
for the deterioration in our current account.
Chart 1
Trade·Weighted Value of Dollar
1980-82 = 100
Enter - Budget Deficits
The US. and Hritish experiences strongly
suggest that the dollar's rise between 1979
and 1981 was a naturaI resu It ofthe
temporary rise in real interest rates that
protracted slowdowns ofmoney growth
normallybring. However/thatsame process
should have allowedourreal interest rates to
begin falling in 1982, when inflation fell to
nearly two percentage points below money
growth so that real liquidity began to
increase. Thus, the dollarmight have been
expected to have fallen since then.
In fact, the dollar has continued to rise since
1982. And again, the cause seemstoliewith
our interest rates. Real short-term interest
rates are now nearly as high as their average
during 1981. Given.the dramatic decline in
our inflation over the last two years, long-
term interest rates here would appear to be
at least as high - perhaps higher - in real
terms that they were in 1981. Why then did
real interest rates not fall as real liquidity
started rising in 1982?ss'"',::> ~Sl:ll::l
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Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments' 165,522 186 1,228 0.7
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 145,328 167
.J 2,183 1.5
Commercial and industrial 44,261 294 - 1,556 - 3.4
Real estate 57,801 58 713 1.2
Loans to individuals 25,967 252 1,958 8.2
Securities loans 3,470 116 643 22.7
U.S. Treasury securities' 7,821 - 26 814 11.6
Othersecurities' 12,371 45 - 1,768 - 12.5
Demand deposits - total# 45,098 1,679 1,959 4.5
Demanddeposits - adjusted 30,355 301 629 2.1
Savingsdeposits - totalt 65,937 - 91 21,444 48.2
Timedeposits - total# 70,404 - 78 - 18,219 - 20.6
Individuals, part. & corp. 64,321 - 118 - 14,352 - 18.2
(Large negotiable CD's) 17,319 - 170 - 13,184 - 43.2
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency (- )
Borrowings
















• Excludes trading accountsecurities.
# Includes items notshown separately.
t Includes Money Market Deposit Accounts, Super-NOWaccounts, and NOWaccounts.
Editorial commentsmaybeaddressedtotheeditor(GregoryTong) ortotheauthor.•..Freecopiesof
thisandotherFederal Reserve publicationscan beobtained by callingorwritingthe Public Informa-
tionSection, Federal Reserve BankofSan Francisco,P.O. Box 7702,San Francisco94120.Phone(415)
974-2246.